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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
ALEC JOE BURNSIDE,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 45901
MADISON COUNTY NO. CR 2017-3211

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Alec Joe Burnside appeals from the district court’s Judgment and Commitment.
Mr. Burnside was sentenced to a unified sentence of ten years, with six years fixed, for his
aggravated driving while under the influence of intoxicating substances conviction. He asserts
that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing him to an excessive sentence without
giving proper weight and consideration to the mitigating factors that exist in his case.
Additionally, he asserts that the district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion
for a reduction of sentence.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On December 8, 2017, a Prosecuting Attorney Information was filed charging
Mr. Burnside with aggravated driving while under the influence of an intoxicating substance.
(R., pp.20-21.) A Part II of the Prosecuting Attorney Information was also filed charging
Mr. Burnside with a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.25-26.) The charges were the
result of a report of an accident between a vehicle and a traffic light pole.

(PSI, p.4.)1

Tragically, Mr. Burnside had three passengers in his vehicle and some of them were very
seriously injured. (PSI, p.4.)
Mr. Burnside entered a guilty plea to the aggravated driving while under the influence of
an intoxicating substance and the persistent violator enhancement was dismissed. (R., pp.25-26.)
At sentencing, the prosecutor requested imposition of a unified sentence of fifteen years, with
eight years fixed, to be served consecutive to his other Madison County cases. (Tr., p.51, Ls.2125, p.52, Ls.10-11.) Defense counsel recommended that Mr. Burnside be allowed to participate
in a period of retained jurisdiction or, if the court would not consider a rider, a short consecutive
sentence or concurrent sentence. (Tr., p.49, Ls.10-18, p.49, L.24 – p.50, L.3.) The district court
imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with six years fixed, consecutive to Mr. Burnside’s other
Madison County cases. (R., pp.29-30.) Mr. Burnside filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the
district court’s Judgment and Commitment. (R., pp.37-39.) He also filed a timely Motion for
Reduction of Sentence. (R., p.50.) Following a hearing on the motion, the motion was denied.
(R, p.51.)

1

For ease of reference, the electronic file containing the Presentence Investigation Report and
attachments will be cited as “PSI” and referenced pages will correspond with the electronic page
numbers contained in this file.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Mr. Burnside, a unified
sentence of ten years, with six years fixed, following his plea of guilty to aggravated
driving while under the influence of an intoxicating substance?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Burnside’s Motion for a
Reduction of Sentence?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon Mr. Burnside, A Unified
Sentence Of Ten Years, With Six Years Fixed, Following His Plea Of Guilty To Aggravated
Driving While Under The Influence Of An Intoxicating Substance
Mr. Burnside asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of ten years,
with six years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed
an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the
record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)).

Mr. Burnside does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory

maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Burnside must show that in
light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id.
(citing State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Brown, 121 Idaho 385 (1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:
(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
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possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting
State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136
Idaho 138 (2001)).
Appellate courts use a three-part test for determining whether a district court abused its
discretion: (1) whether the court correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2)
whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether it reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143 (2008) (citing Sun Valley
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991)).
Mr. Burnside asserts that the district court failed to give proper weight and consideration
to the mitigating factors that exist in his case and, as a result, did not reach its decision by an
exercise of reason.
Specifically, Mr. Burnside asserts that the district court failed to give proper weight and
consideration to his admitted substance abuse problem and desire for treatment. Idaho courts
have previously recognized that substance abuse and a desire for treatment should be considered
as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103
Idaho 89 (1982), see also State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).
Mr. Burnside began using alcohol at the age of 16, marijuana at the age of 17,
methamphetamine at the age of 18, and inhalants at the age of 21. (PSI, p.11.) He admits that he
has significant problems with the use and abuse of marijuana and methamphetamine. (PSI,
p.11.) He was diagnosed with Stimulant Use Disorder – Amphetamine Type, Severe. (PSI,
p.66.) Although he received treatment while on a prior period of retained jurisdiction and
participated, for a brief time, in Drug Court, he has been unable to remain sober and will need
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additional treatment to achieve lasting sobriety. (PSI, p.11.) It was recommended that he
participate in Level 3.5 residential treatment due to his need for 24-hour support and structure.
(PSI, pp.12-13.)
Idaho courts have previously recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial
court to consider a defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho
573, 581 (1999). Mr. Burnside has been previously diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder,
Recurrent, With Psychotic Features and Generalized Anxiety Disorder. (PSI, p.66.) As a
teenager he attempted suicide on two occasions. (PSI, p.10.) He has been prescribed Prozac, but
he only used his medication for a couple months. (PSI, p.10.) Mr. Burnside is still struggling
with depression and anxiety and will likely need additional assistance to deal with his mental
health concerns. (PSI, p.10.)
In addition to dealing with substance abuse issues and mental health concerns,
Mr. Burnside is still a young man. A defendant’s youthful age is a mitigating factor. State v.
Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 224 (1985). Mr. Burnside was only 21 years old when he committed the
instant offense. (PSI, p.3.)
Furthermore, in State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court
noted that family and friend support were factors that should be considered in the Court’s
decision as to what is an appropriate sentence. Id. Mr. Burnside has the support of his mother
and has recently been improving his relationship with his father. (PSI, p.8.)
Finally, Mr. Burnside has expressed his remorse for committing the instant offense. In
State v. Alberts, the Idaho Court of Appeals reduced the sentence imposed, “In light of Alberts’
expression of remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept
treatment and other positive attributes of his character.” Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209. Mr. Burnside
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has expressed his remorse for committing the instant offense stating, “I[‘]m sorry to the people I
hurt and their families. The people I hurt I cared about they are my friends and this is going to
be a life long [sic] sentence for me just knowing that I hurt others due to my choices.” (PSI,
p.13.) He made a similar statement at the time of sentencing:
. . . I take full responsibility for it. I’ve got to live the rest of my life knowing that
I did that to him. He was a friend of mine. That’s all. I’m sorry to the family, to
him, to the other victims. My choices involved other people this time, and that’s
the hardest part.
(Tr., p.52, L.24 – 53, L.4.)
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Burnside asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts that had the
district court properly considered his substance abuse, desire for continued treatment, mental
health issues, young age, family support, and remorse, it would have crafted a less severe
sentence.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Burnside’s Rule 35 Motion For A
Reduction Of Sentence
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if
the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App.
1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21 (Ct. App. 1987) and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447
(Ct. App.1984)). “The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the
same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” Id. (citing
Lopez, 106 Idaho at 450). “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the
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sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the
district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
Appellate courts use a three-part test for determining whether a district court abused its
discretion: (1) whether the court correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2)
whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether it reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143 (2008) (citing Sun Valley
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991)).
Mr. Burnside supplied new or additional information in the form of testimony at the Rule
35 hearing. He asserts that the district court failed to give proper weight and consideration to the
additional information provided in support of his Rule 35 motion and the mitigating factors that
exist in his case and, as a result, did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason.
Specifically, Mr. Burnside testified that:
I just wanted to state that I know what I did was extremely wrong and stupid, and
I want to say that that’s one of my really good friends that is harmed very badly.
My mother has been trying to get ahold of his parents. I don’t know how to get in
touch with them. I don’t even know how he’s doing; and like I said, he’s one of
my really good friends. So I know I’ve screwed his life up a lot, let alone my own
and his family and the other victims. I know there’s no way I can make it right. I
just wanted the Court to know that I understand fully what I’ve done. That’s it.
(Tr., p.74, Ls.4-14.)
Mr. Burnside asserts that in light of the above additional information and the mitigating
factors mentioned in section I, which need not be repeated, but are incorporated by reference, the
district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Burnside respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his Rule 35 motion be
vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 16th day of October, 2018.

/s/ Elizabeth Ann Allred
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
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Administrative Assistant
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